Directorate-General Education and Culture

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Directorate-General Education and Culture

A Europe of achievements

in a changing world

visions of leading policymakers and academics

L'Europe des réalisations

dans un monde en mutation

la vision des leaders politiques et académiques

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Citizenship, migration and intercultural dialogue: defending the connections

Long gone are the days when citizenship was generally considered to be a monocultural (and monochrome) institution. Since the late 1980s, the requirement of states that citi-zens identify with an overriding social and cultural entity, the nation, which furnishes 'the ties that bind' by endowing the relations among individuals with trust and mutual affection, has been seen to rest on questionable premises. This is not only because it rep-resents an oversimplified picture of a much more complex reality of composite peoples having multiple identities, multiple commitments both within and beyond state borders, multiple rights and obligations and, more importantly, a reflexive and tactical subjectiv-ity. It is also due to the fact that national citizenship fails to recognise cultural diversity and, consequently, to address an array of existing inequalities by concealing multicultural, multi-ethnic and polyglossal realities behind homogenising narratives ([1]).

The establishment of European Union citizenship by the Treaty on European Union (1 No-vember 1993), and its subsequent institutional development, showed that community be-longing does not have to be defined on the basis of organic-national qualities, cultural

([1]) Young, Iris Marion (1990), *Justice and the politics of difference*, Princeton University Press; Kymlicka, Will (1995), *Multicultural citizenship*, Oxford University Press.

commonalities or conformity to a certain way of life. Instead, it can be forged out of de facto associative relations and connections that individuals establish by crossing national borders and residing within the territory of another Member State and with *de jure* equal membership irrespective of nationality. Intercultural dialogue provides the normative and institutional resources that are needed for reconstructing political belonging and for cre-ating a collegiate environment within which individuals are given the opportunity to thrive and to be respected partners.

Although citizenship and intercultural dialogue are interconnected in both the European Union and in contemporary polyethnic and multicultural societies, the connections be-tween intercultural dialogue and migration have not been well established. The ques-tion that might be worth considering, here, is this: how should we conceive the relation



between migration and interculturalism? Is it a relation of complementarity or of contradiction? Could it be the case that we tend to believe that links between citizenship and interculturalism are strong because migration has very low connectivity with interculturalism? In this short presentation, I would like to defend the connections between citizenship, migration and interculturalism and to argue that any attempt to dissociate the links would be an unappealing project (see Figure 1). Loosening the connections among them would be counterproductive, since it could undermine democracy, weaken principles, divide civil societies and erode good community relations. Otherwise stated, citizenship, migration and interculturalism could be considered to be a triptychon, thereby forming an integrated normative framework which would successfully reconcile interculturalism with both citizenship and migration laws and policies.

Let me say a few words about interculturalism and citizenship in the European Union. Born out of historical conflict and the pressing need to overcome the destructive tendencies of nationalism, the European Union represents a post-Westphalian order which can function effectively without the support of a settled institutional structure and a concrete, shared finality. Indeed, a key difference between the EU and national polities is that the former is, without a doubt, a community of communities. Endowed with equal status and an equal opportunity to shape its institutional configuration and further evolution, the Member States are entangled in an ongoing project of political experimentation which entails as much interdependence and a shared quest for improved institutional arrangements as contestations, collisions and strife. Owing to EU membership, the Member States have been forced to integrate the doctrine of sovereignty, to learn to trust each other and to accept 'Europe's' impact upon their organising principles, institutions and policies. It could be argued that what sustains the European Union, which is a community of communities, is not the Member States' identification with it. Rather, it is their willingness to participate in an ongoing adventure, which is driven by normative concerns as well as by prudential considerations, to engage with each other in various types of negotiations and to ac-cept the fact that political decisions will not reflect partial, that is, exclusively national interests ([1]). The European Union is thus premised upon a model of political (and social) engagement with dynamic learning in action.

The same model applies horizontally; namely, to interactions among European citizens and other collective actors. Citizens and administrative authorities throughout the

([1]) Kostakopoulou, T. (1996), 'Towards a theory of constructive citizenship in Europe', *Journal of Political Phil-osophy*, Vol. 4, No 4, p. 337; Kostakopoulou, T. (2001), *Citizenship, identity and immigration in the European Union: between past and future*, Manchester University Press.

European Union have realised that the old-fashioned notions of 'immigrant', 'resident alien' and 'temporary guest' do not apply to Community nationals ([1]). The latter are Union citizens, and this status endows them with increasing rights of participation in a wide range of associative relations beyond national borders and the freedom to choose their civic home. Accordingly, the Member States must refrain from imposing any obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms and any other restriction which might render it ineffective or make it less attractive ([2]). In this respect, European citizenship has changed our understanding of political community and made the boundaries of membership more open and flexible. By changing nationals of the Member States from political and often moral 'outsiders' to associates and Union citizens, European integration nurtures cosmopolitan sensitivities and has institutionalised an orientation of openness towards the 'other' (i.e. Community nationals and their family members) ([3]).

But the ethos of openness and non-discrimination that has characterised intra-EU mobility coexists and, in many ways, competes with the logic of control, restriction and closure that has characterised extra-EU migration and the EU framework on integration ([4]). It is interesting that in most western European states migration and integration were considered to be separate domains a few decades ago. Indeed, migration policies at national level were premised on the assumption that integration could only work if migration were restricted. It was generally argued that by building petty-fortresses to filter out the

([1]) Plender, R. (1976), 'An incipient form of European identity', in: F. Jacobs (ed.), *European law and the individual*, North Holland; Poiares Maduro, M. (1998), *We the Court: the European Court of Justice and the European economic constitution*, Hart Publishing; Guild, E. (2004), *Elements of a European identity*, Kluwer.

([2]) On non-discriminatory restrictions, see Daniele, L. (1997), 'Non-discriminatory restrictions to the free movement of persons', *European Law Review*, Vol. 22, p. 191; Castro Oliviera, A. (2002), 'Workers and other persons: step by step from movement to citizenship: case law 1995–2001', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 39, p. 77; Toner, H. (2004), *Partnership rights, free movement and EC law*, Hart Publishing, Chap. 6.

([3]) See Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Mem-ber States, which introduces three separate categories of residence rights and establishes an unqualified right of permanent residence after five years of continuous legal residence in the host Member State; OJL 158/77, 30.4.2004).

([4]) An important pillar of the EU framework on integration constitutes the common principles for the integration of migrants in European societies. In particular, the Hague programme, the successor to the Tampere programme, which outlined the policy priorities for the development of the area of freedom, security and justice in the period 2005–10 and was agreed by the European Council on 4 and 5 November 2004, reiterated the need for greater coordination of national integration policies and EU initiatives and for the development of a clear framework on integration based a set of common principles (CBPs). The JHA Council of 19 November 2004 adopted the CBPs. The principles reflect national priorities and concep-tions and incorporate the discoursive shift of emphasis to migrants' responsibilities to integrate (CBP 1), to respect the basic values of the EU (CBP 2), learn the language, history and institutions of the host society (CBP 4.1), be active societal participants (CBP 5) and the possibility of conflict of cultural and religious practices with European rights or national law (CBP 8.2).

movement of people migrants' settlement, citizenship-building and race relations would be enhanced. Liberal citizenship laws were thus seen to require tighter border controls. In the new millennium, however, we have been witnessing a deliberate alignment of migration and integration in official discourses and policies, despite the problems associated with such an alignment. True, migration brings in people who need to 'be integrated', but it is not a sufficient condition for integration to occur. Otherwise stated, migration does not promote 'integration'. But treating people, irrespective of where they come from and their nationality, with respect and facilitating their access to citizenship, does promote 'integration'. What is also noticeable in the new framing of the nexus between integration and migration is that restrictiveness now extends to both. By imposing mandatory integration conditions abroad or as a condition for the grant of a temporary or a permanent resident permit, governments place the entry and residence of migrants and their naturalisation under tighter control.

It is quite perplexing that governmental elites believe that a sense of 'shared belonging' can emerge by testing one's fluency in the host language and requiring the accumulation of factual information about life in the host state, or about its history and traditions. After all, most of the information one accumulates in this way is bound to be forgotten a few months following the written or oral examination. Certainly, one cannot disregard the Member States' agenda setting power in this field as well as the underlying ideological premises of their positions and assumptions. Ideology is crucial, because integration programmes entail not only devotion to one's values, language and culture and a commitment towards their preservation, but also an implicit or explicit assignment of greater value to one's particular traditions and the stereotyping of other traditions ([1]). Programmes of civic integration and social cohesion are thus allegedly justified on the basis of the need to correct the deficiencies of migrants by encouraging competence in the host language, imparting skills, preparing people for citizenship and re-educating them to respect national values — and not on the basis of national definitions of community, the prevalence of certain conceptions of the nation among elites and their advisers, anxieties about national identity and the desire to make the state (and the party in power) relevant. For if community were conceived of in political terms, qualities, such as a desire to succeed and carve out a space for yourself and your family, to create a home and a better future in foreign lands, a higher motivation to work hard, to persevere, to solve problems, to display economic creativity and entrepreneurship would be given more weight than the

([1]) This applies to national integration programmes and to the common basic principles discussed in No 6 above, such as CBP2 (respect for the basis values of the EU), CBP4 (basic knowledge of the receiving soci-ety's language, history and institutions) and CB8.2 (the practice of diverse cultures and religions must not conflict with other inviolable European rights or national law).

acceptance of traditional markers of national identity, such as knowledge of the language, civics and internalisation of national (and European) values.

It is unfortunate that the political understanding of community and the outward look-ing and dynamic notion of society which was dominant in the 1990s is under threat. Much of the present policy is firmly embedded in a present that not only draws on a nationalist and misremembered past, but it also disregards the long-term point of view. Security concerns and discussion about the role of Islam in western societies might make provincialism an attractive position for some, but one must bear in mind that globalis-ation cannot be reversed and that even a world in financial turmoil is pushed closer together. In addition, multilingualism and diversity are no longer optional extras and the demographic picture makes it quite likely that the future well-being of western socie-ties might well depend on the sacrifices and labour of the very persons they seek to exclude from membership. The European pact on immigration and asylum does not take this into account ([1]). Nor does the EU framework on integration reflect the process-like nature of adaptation and settlement and prioritises interaction, mutual learning and cooperative association between newcomers and existing citizens. Table 1 below shows that intercultural dialogue and pluralism continue to remain credible alternatives, as they put emphasis on what really matters; namely, on developing partnerships, cultivating mutual respect, fostering interactions and dynamic learning in action among majority and migrant communities.

A pluralist approach would recognise that whether newcomers will develop feelings of belonging and a sense of identification depends as much on the kind of institutions and practices of membership that will regulate their lives as on the way they will be treated by the host country. It is hard to imagine, for example, an organisation that, as part of its admissions policy, chooses to impress markers of difference upon new recruits, stressing continually that they are unlike the existing members and that they need to overcome

([1]) The French presidency of the European Council sought a 'renewed political commitment on asylum and immigration' in the form of adopting a European pact on immigration and asylum which would entail the foundations of a common migration and asylum. Following several drafts, agreement on the text of the European pact was reached at the JHA Council on 25 September 2008. This was adopted by European Council on 16 October 2008 in Brussels. The pact endorses the global approach to migration, which was adopted in 2005, and Commission's communication on a common migration policy, and proposed the implementation of five political commitments which would have to be implemented by national and Euro-pean measures: the organisation of legal migration to take into account the priorities, needs and reception capabilities determined by each Member State and to encourage integration; to control illegal immigration by ensuring the return to illegal migrants to their country of origin or a country of transit; the reinforce-ment of external border controls; to construct a Europe of asylum; and comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and transit to encourage synergy between migration and development.

their alleged deficiencies in order to become part of it. Even if such an organisation existed, it would be neither well functioning nor successful. It has been well established that the key to creating a collegiate environment within which individuals are given the opportunity to thrive and to contribute to the success of the organisation, is the provision of support to newcomers, parity of treatment and giving them a sense of being stakeholders. Any other approach simply would not work. By analogy, if the aim is to encourage social cooperation and a sense of shared belonging in European polities and within the European Union, governments would have to refrain from adopting neo-national narratives of fear and division; instead, emphasis should be put on the things that people can do together and on what can be done to improve the conditions and experience of social membership and citizenship for everybody. Institutionalising indirect discrimination based on nationality erodes the credibility of admissions policies and placing multiple hurdles on the path to citizenship or putting people on probation undermines the credibility of naturalisation policy. Given the European institutions' interest in devising a coherent a framework of migration governance, a new deal can be struck in this domain by adopt-ing a common-sense and principled approach that calls for closer links between internal mobility and migration and defends pluralism and intercultural dialogue as principles of political morality in the Member States and within the European Union.

The integration frame	The pluralistic frame
Obsession with national identity.	Belonging as something that develops as a matter of course.
Re-education: newcomers have to unlearn the old and learn the new before being admitted into the country and into political membership.	Newcomers are welcome and encouraged to express their individuality.
The content of re-education is determined by state authorities and includes formal courses, compulsory attendance, specified hours and curriculum.	Learning occurs as matter of fact in everyday life — social interactions, the workplace, the market, religious ceremonies are sites of learning and newcomers should be encouraged to take part in as many spheres of social life as possible.
Learning is an obligation and the cost should be borne by newcomers themselves.	Learning is self-directed, unavoidable and the host society should be actively committed to investing in human capital.
Education to learn the language, history and ways of life of the host society is a means of ensuring social cohesion and harmony.	Linguistic adaptation is a question of time and a positive context of reception facilitates this process. Knowledge of history and ways of life is obtained via living and working in the host country and migrants should be allowed the freedom to pursue their own priorities of making a living, settling and creating a home for themselves and their families.

The integration frame	The pluralistic frame
Coercion — penalties for non-attendance and exam failure.	Being made to feel at home — civic and political participation encouraged and valued.
Passive and subjected status — they must know their place.	Collaborators, stakeholders and citizens in waiting.
It is the responsibility of the newcomers to demonstrate their commitment to the country by jumping over the hurdles and their devotion to its national values.	It is the responsibility of the newcomers to be law abiding and willing contributors to the commonwealth.
Re-certifying their commitment at multiple gates — 'should they really be here?'; who is worthy to belong to the community of citizens?'	A common sense approach — accrediting their resources, skills, hard labour, commitment, dynamism, problem-solving capacity and resilience.
Through integration processes newcomers become part of the nation.	Newcomers become members of the society and their involvement in communities, groups, associations and parallel networks does not create parallel societies; it merely attests the complex and multifaceted character of ordinary life.
Nationality is the foundation of the unity of society — homogeneity (linguistic, cultural, religious or ethnic) is an ideal and the norm.	The unity of society is achieved by doing things together, solving problems together by designing appropriate institutions and by valuing the efforts of all those who contribute to the commonwealth.
Ethnocentric communities by design or default.	Dynamic and relaxed communities.
Integration as hierarchy and intolerance.	Emphasis on participation, equal treatment and non-discrimination.

Table 1: Integration and its alternative

Table 1: ‘popular’ prestigious newspapers and TV prime-time news bulletins monitored ([16])

Publications Office